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Abstract
This paper presents new empirical evidence on the determinants of corruption, fo-
cussing on the role of globalization and inequality. The estimates for a panel of 102
countries over the period 1995-2005 point to three main results: i) Detection technolo-
gies, reflected in a high level of development, human capital, and political rights reduce
corruption, whereas natural resource rents increase corruption. ii) Globalization (in
terms of both trade and financial openness) has a negative effect on corruption, which
is more pronounced in developing countries. iii) Inequality increases corruption, and
once the role of inequality is accounted for, the impact of globalization on corruption
is halved. In line with recent theory, this suggests that globalization – besides reduc-
ing corruption through enhanced competition – affects corruption also by reducing
inequality.
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“It is difficult to overstate the economic and social significance of corruption.”
(Ades and Di Tella, 1999, p.982)
I Introduction
Both the determinants of corruption (rent-seeking behavior) and its welfare consequences
have been subject to extensive theoretical and empirical research (e.g., Krueger, 1974;
Murphy et al., 1993; Mauro, 1995; Bliss and Di Tella, 1997; Das and DiRienzo, 2009; Bhat-
tacharyya and Hodler, 2010). It is widely agreed in the literature that significant economic
rents (in particular through natural resource exports) increase corruption, whereas ’de-
tection technologies’, reflected in a high level of economic development, good institutions,
competitive elections, political rights and press freedom, as well as an educated population
decrease corruption.
At a general level, Svensson (2005) describes corruption as the outcome of a country’s
underlying legal, economic, cultural and political institutions. These factors – which are
widely perceived as determinants of democracy and institutional quality – directly and
indirectly affect the level of corruption. As a consequence, the analysis of the determinants
of corruption is closely related to the literature on democracy and institutional quality.
Previous studies have focussed on the role of globalization as a determinant of institu-
tional quality and corruption. One strand of this literature emphasizes the pro-competitive
effect of trade. Ades and Di Tella (1999) find that an increase in trade openness leads
to a decline in corruption and argue that import competition reduces the rents for do-
mestic firms and thus the rewards from corrupt activities. A related argument can be
made with respect to financial openness, since increased FDI and market entry of foreign
firms are typically conducive to domestic competition. There is also evidence for a two-
way relationship between competition (trade) and corruption: Emerson (2006) shows that
corruption significantly decreases the number of firms and thus the level of competition
within a country.
Recent theoretical work by Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) highlights the role of in-
equality as another channel through which globalization (in terms of both trade and fi-
nancial openness) affects institutional quality. Building on the Heckscher-Ohlin model,
they argue that when a labor abundant developing country opens up to trade or capital
inflows, inequality is reduced since wages will increase relative to the return to capital.
With a lower level of inequality, democracy becomes less redistributive and thus more
likely. According to this reasoning, globalization is expected to affect democracy (and
thereby also corruption) in developing countries both via trade and financial openness
and mainly through its effect on inequality.
While the detrimental role of corruption for economic development is undisputed and
there is also strong evidence on the link between trade and corruption, the empirical liter-
ature on the role of financial openness is sparse. One notable exception, using democracy
rather than corruption as the dependent variable, is Eichengreen and Leblang (2008), who
find evidence for a positive effect of financial openness. This lack of studies is surprising
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in light of the surge in financial openness over the last two decades that has outpaced the
increase in trade openness (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)). Moreover, there is hardly
any evidence on the transmission channels through which globalization affects corrup-
tion. In particular, to the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical study that has
focussed on the interplay of globalization (in terms of both trade and financial openness)
and inequality in reducing corruption.
Against this background, the present paper makes the following contributions to the
empirical literature on the globalization-corruption nexus. First, we use an encompassing
model that relates corruption to globalization in terms of both trade and financial open-
ness, thereby paying particular attention to the potential endogeneity of our globalization
measures. Second, we explicitly consider the role of inequality as a determinant of cor-
ruption and its interplay with globalization, allowing us to provide some evidence on the
transmission channels through which globalization affects corruption. Third, unlike pre-
vious studies that are mainly based on cross-sections of countries, we use a (unbalanced)
panel of (up to) 102 countries over the period 1995-2005, allowing us to substantially in-
crease the number of observations, exploit the time-variation in the data, and to control
for region-specific effects.
In line with recent studies we find that a higher level of development, more education
and political rights, and a lack of natural resource rents are negatively associated with
corruption. Globalization, in terms of both trade and financial openness, appears to play
an important role in reducing corruption, particularly in developing countries. Accounting
for the effect of inequality, which itself increases corruption, the effect of globalization is
halved, which provides empirical support for the theoretical argument by Acemoglu and
Robinson (2005) that globalization affects democracy (and thereby, institutional quality
and corruption) through its negative effect on inequality.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II gives a brief overview
of the literature on globalization, inequality, and corruption. Section III sets up the em-
pirical model, describes the data used, and outlines our identification strategy. Section IV
presents the estimation results. The final section V summarizes the results and concludes.
II Globalization, Inequality, and Corruption: A Brief Sur-
vey of the Literature
The literature on the links and interactions between globalization, institutional quality,
and corruption is extensive. In the following we provide a very brief survey with a focus
on the effects of trade and financial openness, the role of inequality, and the link between
democracy and corruption. For a more comprehensive survey of the literature on global-
ization and institutional quality, see Eichengreen and Leblang (2008); for a detailed review
of the globalization-inequality nexus, see Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007).
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1. Globalization, Competition, and Corruption
Ades and Di Tella (1999) suggest that an increase in trade openness leads to a decline in
corruption. Since firms can reap some of the rents by exchanging control rights for bribes,
there will be a positive relationship between corruption and rents. In their empirical
analysis, using a cross-section of 52 (31) countries over the period 1980-1983 (1989-1990)
for the Business International Corporation’s corruption survey (World Competitiveness
Report corruption index), they relate corruption to competition (proxied by the share of
imports in GDP and the distance to world’s major exporters) and the share of fuel and
mineral exports in total exports. They find that imports and proximity to world’s major
exporters significantly reduce corruption, whereas fuel and mineral exports increase cor-
ruption. Ades and Di Tella (1999) interpret this result as strong evidence that competition
from foreign firms leads to a decrease in the rents of domestic firms and consequently to
a decline in corruption. Leite and Weidmann (1999) also find a negative effect of trade
openness on corruption using a cross-section of 72 countries and the ICRG corruption
index in 1995. A positive effect of natural resource rents on corruption is also identified in
the recent study by Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010) for a sample of 124 countries over
the period 1980-2004.
Pro-competitive effects, reducing the scope for corruption due to a decrease in bureau-
cratic power, do not only stem from international trade. Increased competition might also
be a consequence of domestic market deregulation and policies facilitating firms’ engage-
ment in international activity (Svensson, 2005). Hence, trade might capture only part of
the effects of competition on corruption. Das and DiRienzo (2009) cast doubt on the linear
effect of globalization on corruption. Using a cross-section of 113 countries for the period
2008 and the KOF index as a broader measure of globalization (which includes economic,
political and social integration and Transparency International’s corruption perception
index), they find that only countries with moderate levels of globalization can capture the
positive effects of further integration. At lower levels of globalization, an increased par-
ticipation in the global market may even increase the scope for corruption due to a poor
regulative environment. Lalountas, Manolas and Vavouras (2011), voicing similar critique
in an analysis for a cross-section of 127 countries in 2006 and using the same set of vari-
ables as Das and DiRienzo (2009), find that globalization significantly reduces corruption
in middle- and high income countries, once nonlinearities and the endogeneity of GDP per
capita are accounted for, while globalization has no effect in low-income countries.
2. Globalization, Inequality, and Democracy
Corruption can also be interpreted as a more general indicator of institutional quality,
reflecting a country’s underlying legal, economic, cultural and political institutions (Svens-
son, 2005). In the following, we review some of the literature on the relationship between
globalization and democracy, which we consider relevant in identifying potential deter-
minants of corruption. At the heart of our empirical analysis is the recent theoretical
argument by Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) emphasizing the role of inequality. They
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show that the emergence and survival of democracy depend on the distribution of income
and thus on factor prices. Thus globalization in terms of international trade and financial
openness will affect democracy and institutional quality through its effect on factor prices.
In a Heckscher-Ohlin framework with labor abundant (and capital scarce) developing
countries as a representative case, opening up to trade leads to an increase in the wage-
rental ratio (Stolper-Samuelson and Heckscher-Ohlin theorem). This reduces the income
gap between factors and thereby also the risk of political conflict, since voters of lower
income groups have less demand for highly redistributive policies. As a consequence,
democracy becomes less threatening to upper income groups and the elite. A similar
argument applies to financial openness, which increases the elasticity of capital supply,
leading to an inflow of capital in labor abundant countries. This lowers the relative
return to capital, thereby reducing the income gap between factor earnings, and supports
democratic development.
Of course, if labor is scarce and capital abundant, these effects are reversed.1 If the
developing country is land abundant, opening up to trade increases the income of land
owners who typically represent a small elite, inequality increases and democracy becomes
less likely. As a consequence, the bottom line effect of globalization on democracy (and
corruption) remains an empirical question (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005, p.282).
López-Córdova and Meissner (2008), analyzing the determinants of democracy, pro-
vide support for the close relation between international trade, natural resources and
institutional outcomes based on a sample of three time periods spanning 130 years from
1870-1919, 1917-1939 and 1960-2000. Using the same data set, empirical evidence on the
positive effect of financial integration on democracy is given by Eichengreen and Leblang
(2008). However, none of these studies have considered trade and financial openness simul-
taneously or explicitly taken into account the role of inequality as a transmission channel.
In a recent paper Levchenko (2011) demonstrates that the consequences of globaliza-
tion for institutional quality may vary across pairs of countries. He considers the role of
institutions as a determinant of comparative advantage in trade. Institutions generate
rents for some parties within the economy. When two countries with similar technology
open up to trade, institutional quality will improve in both countries as rents disappear in
the country with inferior institutions. However, if technological differences between trad-
ing partners are big enough, specialization patterns will not change and trade might not
reduce rents and hence provide no incentive for institutional improvement. Using a sam-
ple of 139 countries for a cross-section over the period 1996-2000 Levchenko (2011) finds
supportive evidence that trade in institutionally intensive goods improves institutional
quality.
1However, regarding the role of financial openness, Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) argue that a capital
flight might lead to a cut in capital taxes (as predicted by median voter models), which might stop and
redirect capital flows, ultimately leading to lower capital returns and more democracy.
5
3. Democracy and Corruption
As evident from this brief survey, the links and interactions between globalization, in-
equality, institutional quality and corruption are manyfold and intertwined. This paper
does not aim at incorporating all these interrelationships into the empirical analysis but
rather puts its emphasis on some aspects and relationships that have not been considered
in the literature so far, namely the role of financial openness besides trade openness, the
role of inequality, and its interplay with globalization.
Since the theoretical motivation for our empirical analysis partly relies on the effect of
globalization on democracy, some words on the link between democracy and corruption
are in order here. Most theoretical models assume a negative relationship, with more
democracy reducing corruption. In that case, a positive effect of globalization on democ-
racy as hypothesized in Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) would translate directly into a
negative effect on corruption. However, it should be added that this clear cut relationship
between democracy and corruption is not undisputed and the empirical evidence is mixed.
Rock (2009), for example, argues that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between
democracy and corruption. However, the turning point occurs rather early in the life of
new democracies (after some 10 years). Hence, in a sample where recently established
democracies are the exception rather than the rule, we would expect the negative effect of
democracy on corruption to dominate, such that the theoretical rationale underlying the
globalization-democracy nexus adds to the motivation of the empirical test of the effect
of globalization on corruption.
III Empirical Model and Data
1. Basic Model Specification
The starting point for our baseline empirical model is the specification in Ades and Di Tella
(1999), who relate corruption (CI) to trade openness (TO) and a set of control variables,
namely GDP per capita (Y/L), human capital (HC), political rights (PR), and resource
rents (RR). Our specification departs from theirs in three respects: First, we use a
panel rather than a cross-section of countries, which allows us to increase the number of
observations and to control for region-specific fixed effects. While most of the variation
in our dependent variable is across countries rather than over time, using a panel (with
year specific fixed effects) has the further advantage to avoid ’snapshot-results’ specific to
a single time period.2
Second, following the theoretical reasoning in section II, we include financial openness
(FO) besides trade openness (TO) to obtain a more comprehensive measure of globaliza-
tion and to asses the respective roles of its two major dimensions. Third, we will consider
2The issue of the sensitivity of cross-section regressions with respect to the choice of the reference year
has been prominently raised by Baier and Bergstrand (2007). Estimating the same cross-sectional gravity
model on the trade effects of free trade agreements (FTAs) for alternative time periods, they find that
“the FTA dummy’s coefficient estimates are highly unstable from year to year” (Baier and Bergstrand,
2007, p.76).
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specifications including a measure of income inequality (IQ), which allows us to provide
an assessment of its role as a determinant of corruption, its interplay with globalization,
and the transmission channels through which globalization affects corruption. Hence, our
most comprehensive empirical model reads:
CIi,t = β0+β1 ln(Y/L)i,t+β2HCi,t+β3PRi,t+β4RRi,t+β5TOi,t+β6FOi,t+β7IQi,t+ηr+νt+ui,t.
(1)
The dependent variable CI is a country’s score on the corruption perception index from
Transparency International, which defines corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power
for private gain” in the public and private sector with a special focus on politicians,
civil servants and public officials.3 The index ranges from zero to ten, where low values
correspond to high levels of corruption. For the ease of interpretation we rescale the index,
taking the difference to the maximum possible value (10), such that higher values of CI
are associated with higher levels of corruption.
GDP per capita, human capital, and political rights are used as overall indicators of
economic development and as a proxy for ’detection technologies’, which reduce rent seek-
ing behavior (Ades and Di Tella, 1999). Real GDP per capita (Y/L) in 2005 international
dollars is from the Penn World Tables 7.0. Human capital (HC), measured as mean years
of schooling for the working age population, is from the Barro and Lee (2011) data set. As
an indicator of political rights and civil liberty, we use the Freedom House index, which
summarizes the extent of competitive elections, political rights, press freedom, freedom
of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal
autonomy and individual rights. It is defined over a range from 0 to 7 with higher values
being associated with more political freedom and civil liberties. Data on the variable PR
is taken from Norris (2009).
Rents generated by natural resources (RR) are included as a measure of exogenously
created rents for domestic firms. As with other rents, we expect that resource rents increase
corruption (Leite and Weidmann, 1999; Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2010). Data is taken
from the the World Bank’s WDI database.
Trade openness (TO) is defined as ratio of imports plus exports to GDP (at current
prices) and taken from the Penn World Tables 7.0, financial openness (FO) is defined
as ratio of total foreign assets plus liabilities to GDP and taken from the updated and
extended version of the data set by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
Inequality (IQ) is measured by the Gini index. We use the net Gini index, which
takes redistributional measures into account and thus corresponds more closely to our
theoretical motivation than its gross counterpart. The index is increasing in inequality
and ranges from 0 to 100. For ease of interpretation, the Gini index is divided by 10 and
thus defined over the interval from 0 to 10. Data is taken from Solt (2012).
While the time series properties of our variables rule out the use of country-specific
3See the Transparency International Homepage, http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011,
27.01.2012.
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fixed effects, we include a set of 10 regional dummy variables ηr in order to control for
unobserved, time-invariant determinants of corruption.4 Finally, νt are year-specific fixed
effects and ui,t is an idiosyncratic error term.
The time period of our panel (t) ranges from 1995-2005, a choice which is mainly
determined by the availability of data on the corruption index by Transparency Interna-
tional. It was first collected for 40 countries in 1995 and the coverage has increased to
178 countries in 2005. Taking availability of the data on the other variables used in our
empirical analysis into account, we end up with an unbalanced panel, ranging from 32 up
to 82 countries over the period 1995-2005 with a total of 695 observations. A detailed
overview of the countries in our sample and the period coverage is given in Table A1 in
the appendix.
2. Instrumental Variables and Identification
As emphasized in the literature, trade and financial openness are likely to be endogenous
in equation (1), since the causality may also run from corruption to globalization (Ades
and Di Tella, 1999; Emerson, 2006; Eichengreen and Leblang, 2008; Levchenko, 2011). We
use instrumental variable (IV) estimation to obtain consistent estimates and to identify
the causal effect of globalization on corruption.
As an instrument for trade openness, we follow the standard approach introduced by
Frankel and Romer (1999) and use (the country-specific sum of the) predicted values from a
bilateral gravity model that includes geographical variables only. In particular, we regress,
for each year, bilateral trade (the log of imports plus exports as share of GDP) on country
size (in terms of population and area), distance, a common border dummy, and interactions
between all variables and the common border dummy. Then we generate predicted values
for (the level of) bilateral trade flows, including all partner countries for which data on the
explanatory variables is available, and sum them up to country-specific predicted trade
shares. This country specific ’geographical trade share’ or proximity measure, referred to
as T̂O, is then used as instrument for trade openness in the IV estimation of equation
(1).5
The gravity model has been shown to perform well not only for trade but also for
financial flows (Portes and Rey, 2005; Guerin, 2006), where distance assumes the interpre-
tation of informational frictions rather than trade costs. Likewise, Badinger (2009) shows
that the performance of the geographical gravity instrument based on bilateral trade is
similar for (aggregate) trade and financial openness. As a consequence, we will use T̂O as
an instrument for financial openness (FO) in equation (1) as well.
4In particular, dummy variables are used for the following regions: Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, East
Asia, South-East Asia, Pacific Islands, Middle East and North Africa, Latin America, Caribbean and
Non-Iberian America, Central and Eastern Europe, Western Europe. The data source is Norris (2009).
5Bilateral trade data are from the Correlates of War database (Barbieri and Keshk, 2012), geographical
variables from the CEP II database. As a first indication of instrument quality, the correlation between the
actual bilateral trade data and the predicted values in our gravity model with some 14, 000 observations
(on average per year) amounts to 0.63.
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Obviously, when both openness measures are included in equation (1), additional instru-
ments are required to separately identify the effects of trade and financial openness. This
task is severely aggravated by the high correlation between TO and FO, which amounts
to 0.40 in our sample.6
Following the identification strategy of Badinger (2009) we employ (de jure, policy
related) measures of trade and financial integration as additional instruments. In partic-
ular, we use the trade and financial freedom indices of the Heritage Foundation, which
have been employed, e.g., by Das and DiRienzo (2009).7 The Heritage Foundation trade
freedom index, referred to as F TO, is a composite measure of the trade-weighted average
tariff rate and non-tariff barriers (NTB) on trade in goods and services, taken from various
sources such as the World Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Office of
the U.S. Trade Representative.
The corresponding financial freedom index FFO focuses on the extent of government
regulation of financial services, the degree of state intervention in banks and other fi-
nancial firms, financial and capital market development, government influence on credit
allocation and openness to foreign competition. It is based, among others, on data from
the Economist Intelligence Unit, the International Monetary Fund, and the OECD. Both
indices are scaled between zero and 100 with higher values indicating fewer restrictions on
trade and financial markets.8 Of course, the use of policy based variables as instruments
raises some concerns, since they could be correlated with other domestic policies affecting
corruption. Hence, it will be important to carefully test for instrument validity in the
empirical analysis below.
3. Descriptive Statistics
Before turning to the estimation results, Table 1 provides some descriptives statistics on
the main variables used. There is considerable variation in our dependent variable mainly
over the cross-section. The lowest corruption values are observed for Canada, Denmark,
Finland, Norway, and Switzerland, whereas examples for countries at the upper end of
the distribution are Bangladesh, Bolivia, and Tajikistan. Inequality is most pronounced
in Chile, Honduras, and Panama, the most equal income distribution in terms of the Gini
index is shown by Sweden, the Netherlands, and Denmark. Highest values for the political
rights variable are obtained by the U.S. and also in many European countries, low values
are observed for China, Vietnam, and Syria.
Notice that the correlations shown in the lower panel of Table 1 are suggestive and
correspond to the theoretical expectations. GDP per capita, human capital, political rights
6Using Granger causality tests, Aizenman and Noy (2009) show that trade and financial openness are
intricately intertwined. In general, constructing convincing instruments that explain the exogenous vari-
ation in trade openness but not financial openness (and vice versa) is a challenging task, given that the
underlying drivers of these two dimensions of openness are largely equivalent as evident from the good
performance of the gravity model for both variables.
7While there are alternative de jure measures of trade and financial openness, the ones by the Heritage
Foundation are time variant and have the largest coverage for our sample of countries and years.
8For a detailed description of the Heritage Foundation’s methodology and data sources, see http://www.
heritage.org/index/book/methodology.
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and the openness measures are negatively correlated with corruption. Resource rents show
a positive association with corruption. Inequality is positively correlated with corruption
and shows a negative correlation with the two openness measures, which are themselves
strongly correlated with each other. Finally, the (trade-based) gravity instrument shows
a strong correlation with the two openness measures, which is slightly higher for trade
openness.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
a) Descriptives Mean Median Std.Dev. Max. Min.
CI 5.173 6.000 2.411 9.600 0.000
ln(Y/L) 9.063 9.101 1.119 10.793 6.080
HC 8.454 8.805 2.360 12.869 1.024
PR 5.402 6.000 1.622 7.000 1.000
RR 0.043 0.016 0.082 0.733 0.000
TO 0.788 0.680 0.448 3.777 0.132
FO 2.030 1.399 2.121 19.851 0.397
IQ 3.680 3.510 0.867 6.178 2.171
T̂O 1.759 1.444 1.065 5.591 0.320
FTO 68.472 72.800 13.550 85.000 0.000
FFO 58.144 50.000 18.562 90.000 10.000
b) Correlations CI ln(Y/L) HC PR RR TO FO IQ T̂O FTO
ln(Y/L) -0.798
HC -0.572 0.746
PR -0.637 0.690 0.586
RR 0.282 -0.163 -0.131 -0.420
TO -0.167 0.172 0.252 0.024 -0.062
FO -0.504 0.419 0.273 0.321 -0.147 0.396
IQ 0.544 -0.550 -0.515 -0.387 0.176 -0.199 -0.282
T̂O -0.264 0.338 0.422 0.325 -0.224 0.528 0.347 -0.611
FTO -0.544 0.640 0.581 0.576 -0.205 0.269 0.337 -0.307 0.354
FFO -0.539 0.485 0.440 0.528 -0.405 0.148 0.413 -0.210 0.258 0.455
All descriptive statistics and correlations are based on a sample of 695 observations for 102 countries over the
period 1995-2005. See the appendix for details.
IV Estimation Results
1. Separate Results for Trade Openness and Financial Openness
We start with the estimation results for model (1), including one of our two openness
measures at a time. The first column in Table 2 reports the least squares estimates for
the specification, where only the controls reflecting detection technologies (along with
region and time dummies) are included. All variables enter significantly and show the
expected sign. A higher level of development, reflected in higher per capita income, a
better educated population, and more political participation and rights have a negative
effect on (i.e., reduce) corruption. Revenues from resource exports significantly increase
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corruption in each specification. These results are in line with previous findings by Ades
and Di Tella (1999), Leite and Weidmann (1999), Emerson (2006), and Bhattacharyya
and Hodler (2010). The regional dummy variables, which are not reported in Table 2 for
the sake of brevity, are jointly significant at 1 percent and will thus be included in all
specifications.
To assess the economic significance of the coefficients, note that the average of the
corruption index is 5.17. Hence, an increase in GDP per capita by 10 percent lowers
corruption by 0.11 index points or 2.14 percent in relative terms (evaluated at the sample
mean). One more year of schooling lowers corruption by 0.20 index points (or 2.40 percent
of its mean). An increase in the political rights index by one standard deviation (i.e., 30
percent of its mean) reduces corruption by 0.19 index points (or 3.19 percent), the implied
average elasticity is −0.12. Finally, natural resource rents have a strong positive effect. An
increase of resource rents (measured as share of GDP) by one percentage point increases
corruption by 0.03 index points (or 0.49 percent). The magnitude of these effects is very
similar in the alternative specifications that will be considered in the following.
Table 2: Corruption and Trade (Financial) Openness: Estimation Results for Model (1)
Dependent variable CI
(1) (2a) 2b (2c) (3a) (3b) (3c)
LS LS IV IV LS IV IV
ln(Y/L) -1.106*** -0.978*** -0.968*** -0.871*** -1.078*** -1.008*** -0.883***
(0.122) (0.080) (0.085) (0.103) (0.105) (0.079) (0.098)
HC -0.203*** -0.164*** -0.160*** -0.186*** -0.175*** -0.103** -0.158***
(0.036) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.046) (0.039)
PR -0.115** -0.161*** -0.165*** -0.117*** -0.133*** -0.179*** -0.120***
(0.051) (0.039) (0.040) (0.043) (0.046) (0.042) (0.044)
RR 2.537*** 1.782*** 1.720*** 2.131*** 2.254*** 1.529*** 2.068***
(0.553) (0.445) (0.478) (0.486) (0.514) (0.550) (0.518)
TO -0.860*** -0.931*** -0.524**
(0.124) (0.211) (0.204)
FO -0.124*** -0.443*** -0.232**
(0.043) (0.106) (0.091)
IQ 0.626*** 0.682***
(0.098) (0.100)
Hausman1 (0.681) (0.065) (0.002) (0.265)
Instr. Quality2 279.26 302.76 39.81 49.36
Adj.R2 0.792 0.807 0.807 0.816 0.799 0.751 0.808
SEE 1.100 1.060 1.060 1.033 1.081 1.204 1.057
Obs. 695 695 695 695 695 695 695
All models are based on an unbalanced panel of 102 countries over the period 1995-2005 (695 observations)
and include region- and time-specific fixed effects. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent
level. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
1 Robust Hausman test for the exogeneity of TO and FO respectively.
2 Stock and Yogo test for weak instruments: F -statistic on excluding T̂O from first stage regression.
Column (2a) shows the results for model (1) with the trade openness measure (TO) in-
cluded. In line with Ades and Di Tella (1999) we find a strong negative effect on corruption.
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Addressing endogeneity concerns and reestimating the model by IV, using the geograph-
ical trade share (T̂O) as an instrument for TO, its effect remains statistically significant
and even increases in magnitude. The corresponding results in column (2b) suggest that
an increase in trade openness by 10 percentage points lowers corruption by 0.09 index
points (or 1.80 percent); the implied elasticity, evaluated at the sample mean amounts to
−0.14.
Instrument quality is fine with an F -statistic of 279.28 on excluding T̂O from the first
stage regression; this by far exceeds the critical value (of 16.38) for the null hypothesis
that instrument quality is below the highest quality level in terms of the Stock and Yogo
(2005) weak instruments test. Also notice that the Hausman test clearly rejects the null of
exogeneity, reinforcing empirically the importance to account for the endogeneity of trade
as suggested by economic theory.
In a subsequent step we include inequality (IQ) as an additional regressor. If trade
affects corruption mainly through inequality, we would expect the coefficient of TO to
become insignificant or at least to be strongly reduced. As can be seen from the IV
estimates in column (2c), the coefficient of TO is roughly halved to −0.52 but remains
statistically significant at 5 percent. This suggests that inequality is in fact one important
yet not the only channel through which trade affects corruption. Regarding the role of
inequality itself, its effect on corruption is sizeable: an increase by one standard deviation
increases corruption by 0.54 index points (or 10.5 percent); the implied elasticity amounts
to 0.45.
We next turn to the regressions including financial openness. As with trade, the
Hausman tests reject the exogeneity of the variable FO. The quality of the (trade-based)
gravity instrument T̂O turns out weaker for FO, but the F -statistic of 39.81 is still far
above the critical value for the highest instrument quality level judged by the Stock and
Yogo (2005) weak instruments test. Comparing the least squares estimates in column
(3a) with the IV estimates in column (3b), we observe an increase in the magnitude of the
coefficient of FO from −0.12 to −0.44. The implied elasticity of corruption with respect to
financial openness amounts to −0.17. Once we include inequality as an additional variable
(column (3c)), the coefficient of FO goes down to −0.23, which is approximately half of its
value in column (3b). Again, this indicates that inequality is an important transmission
channel through which financial openness affects corruption.
Summing up our separate results so far, the exogeneity for both variables TO and FO
is clearly rejected. Their effect on corruption is quantitatively similar with an elasticity
around−0.15, which is halved when inequality is controlled for. A natural questions arising
from the analysis so far is whether there is a separate role for each openness measure. In
that case, the estimated effect of trade openness (TO) in columns (2b) and (2c) would be
biased due to the omission of financial openess (FO), which is strongly correlated with
TO. The same reasoning applies to the estimates including financial openness only in
columns (3b) and (3c), where TO is omitted.
Before turning to the analysis including both openness measures, we provide an indirect
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test of whether the two openness measures both play an independent role. First, assume
that financial openness (FO) were irrelevant in the model including trade openness (TO) in
column (2c). In that case, financial openness would qualify as a (high quality) instrument
for trade openness. Under the maintained assumption that the instrument T̂O is valid, this
can be checked by adding FO as an instrument for TO in the specification in column (2c)
and testing for overidentifying restrictions (OID). It turns out that the OID test rejects
the null of valid instrument with a p-value of 0.005 and the coefficient of TO increases in
magnitude from −0.52 to −0.85. Analogously, adding TO as an instrument for FO to the
model in column (3c), the coefficient of FO increases in magnitude from −0.23 to −0.37
and the null hypothesis of valid instruments is rejected by the OID test with a p-value of
0.08. We interpret these results as strong evidence that FO (TO) is an omitted variable
in column (2c) (in column (3c)). In other words, both openness measures play an genuine
role, i.e., they matter simultaneously and omitting one of the two variables will lead to
biased estimates of the effect of the other.
2. Results for Models Including Both Trade and Financial Openness
The first two columns in Table 3 show the least squares estimates, when trade and financial
openness are included at the same time. As before the Hausman test rejects the null of
exogeneity of TO and FO such that we focus on the IV estimates in the following. Column
(1b) reports the TSLS estimates, using T̂O and the two policy measures F TO and FFO
as instruments. It is worth emphasizing that the coefficients of TO and FO turn out to
be very close with values of −0.34 and −0.29 respectively, and they are indistinguishable
in statistical terms (The p-value of the F -test for parameter equality amounts to 0.88.)
It should be noted, however, that the variable TO becomes insignificant, which is not
too surprising in light of the high correlation with FO (and among the instruments),
which inflates the standard errors. Adding further instruments does not appear to be a
promising route. Even in the specification in column (1b), the OID test rejects the null
of valid instruments at 5 percent, raising concerns about the use of the two policy based
instruments F TO and FFO for identification.
Notwithstanding these qualifications, the overall results suggest that the effects of TO
and FO are both qualitatively and quantitatively similar. Moreover, including inequality
roughly halved the coefficient of both TO and FO (compare Table 1). Hence, we proceed
with a restricted model in the following, including a joint openness measure (TO + FO),
which also allows us to dispense from using the policy based instruments F TO and FFO
and stick with the geography based gravity instrument T̂O.
Column (1c) shows the results where the parameters of TO and FO are restricted to
equality. Its coefficient turns out the be −0.30, which is smaller in magnitude than the
corresponding estimates in Table 2, where TO (FO) apparently also captures the effect
of FO (TO). The implied average elasticity with respect to the joint openness measure
amounts to −0.16. Adding inequality in column (1d), we observe again a reduction in
the effect of globalization by around one half. Hence, the qualitative conclusions from the
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separate regressions are unchanged, though the magnitude of the effect of each variable is
smaller now. The model in column (1d) is our preferred specification, and we will further
explore its robustness in the following.
Considering alternative functional forms, we first investigate whether there is a more
intricate interplay between globalization and inequality by including an interaction term
between (TO + FO) and IQ. This hypothesizes that the effect of globalization is larger
for higher levels of inequality. The results in column (2) provide no support for this
specification. Column (3) specifies a possibly (inverted) U-shaped relationship between
corruption and globalization by including a quadratic term of (TO+FO). (This requires
the (questionable) use of the policy based instruments F TO and FFO to achieve sensible
estimates.) There is some evidence on nonlinearities and a decreasing effect, since the
coefficient of the quadratic term is positive and significant at the 10 percent level. However,
the average effect, evaluated at the sample mean amounts to −0.52 and the turning point
occurs at a very high level of 9.82, which is only exceeded by a total of 15 observations for a
few countries (Belgium, Malta, Ireland, Switzerland, and Singapore). Also, the F -statistic
does not exceed the lowest critical value in terms of the Stock and Yogo (2005) weak
instruments test, and thus casts doubt on a quadratic relationship between globalization
and corruption.
Hence, in light of the weak significance of the quadratic term and the small number
of observations above the turning point, using a log specification appears to be a more
plausible choice to specify decreasing effects of globalization. Results with and without
inequality included are given in columns (4a) and (4b). Theory is silent on whether to use
to the level or the log, specification tests are inconclusive across the specifications, and
the adjusted R2 is very close in both models. Therefore, it is reassuring that our results
are qualitatively and quantitatively insensitive with respect to the choice of levels or logs.
As can bee seen from column (4a), the coefficient of the log of the joint openness measure
(TO+FO) is highly significant and points to an elasticity of −0.17, which is very close to
the average elasticity from the estimates in levels (−0.16). Including inequality in column
(4b) reduces the effect of globalization by 40 percent.
To ensure that our results are not driven by outliers, we reestimate the preferred
specifications in columns (1c) and (1d), excluding all observations where the standardized
residuals exceed an absolute value of 2. Results in columns (5a) and (5b) show that the
results are essentially unchanged. Finally, we explore the subsample stability with respect
to the cross-section dimension. This is potentially important, since the the theoretical
motivation of our empirical model is stronger for developing countries. Given the relatively
small cross-section dimension, we test for differences by including an interaction term of
our joint openness measure (TO + FO) with a dummy for OECD membership (D).9
Using T̂O (and its interaction with the OECD dummy) as instruments, we find that the
coefficient of the interaction term, representing the difference of the effect for the OECD
9We do not include a separate constant for OECD countries, which would be highly collinear with the
regional dummies.
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group, is positive and significant (column (6a)). The magnitude suggests that the effect of
globalization on corruption is close to zero for the group of OECD countries, which is also
confirmed by an F -test on the sum of the parameters for (TO+FO) and (TO+FO)×D. If
the policy based variables F TO and FFO are added as further instruments (column (6b),
the effect of globalization on corruption is reduced in magnitude for OECD countries
but not eliminated. Hence, we carefully argue that the effect is more pronounced in
developing countries. Given the small subsample, the results should not be overstressed
but taken together with the theoretical rationale underlying the globalization-corruption
nexus, with the relatively high level of trade and financial openness and relatively low level
of corruption in OECD countries, a smaller effect for this subgroup of countries appears
to be a very plausible result.
Our main results establish a negative effect of globalization on corruption. Although
the number of questions that can be answered with a reduced form empirical model such
as equation (1) is limited, we argue that our results indirectly suggest that globalization
reduces inequality. At least it is very difficult to think of any convincing transmission
channels and interrelationships that could reconcile our key results (the negative effect of
globalization on corruption, the positive effect of inequality, and the reduction in the effect
of globalization once inequality is controlled for) with a positive (or insignificant) effect of
globalization on inequality.
V Conclusions
Using an unbalanced panel of 102 countries over the period 1995-2005, this paper investi-
gates the determinants of corruption, thereby paying particular attention to the effects of
globalization and its interplay with inequality, which has been suggested as a key trans-
mission channel in theoretical work by Acemoglu and Robinson (2005). As measures of
globalization, both trade and financial openness are considered; to establish their causal
effect on corruption, we exploit the exogeneity of countries’ geographical characteristics
as determinants of openness.
In line with previous studies we find that ’detection technologies’, approximated by
GDP per capita, education and political rights, significantly reduce corruption while natu-
ral resource rents increase corruption. Globalization significantly reduces corruption with
a more pronounced effect in developing countries. We find that both measures of globaliza-
tion play an independent role in reducing corruption, such that omitting financial (trade)
openness leads to an upward bias of the estimated effect of trade (financial) openness.
However, the quantitative effects of trade and financial openness on globalization are very
similar, which allows focussing on a joint measure of globalization.
We find that inequality increases corruption. Moreover, the effect of both trade and
financial openness (and the joint globalization measure) are halved, once the effect of
inequality is controlled for. This confirms the role of inequality as a transmission channel
through which globalization affects corruption. The remaining and equally important
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effect is most likely to be due to the pro-competitive effect of globalization, which has
been emphasized in previous studies (Ades and Di Tella, 1999; Emerson, 2006).
Overall, our results also provide indirect evidence that globalization has a negative ef-
fect on inequality. However, the transmission channels through which globalization affects
corruption (inequality, and thereby democracy and institutional quality) are manyfold and
intertwined, with causality potentially running into both directions. Moreover, changes
in the institutional arrangements required by supranational trade associations (Das and
DiRienzo, 2009), trade patterns and countries’ technological and institutional position rel-
ative to its trading partners (Levchenko, 2011) can be expected to have both direct and
indirect effects on corruption as well as on globalization. Against this background, consid-
ering and disentangling these interrelationship in a simultaneous system of equations and
developing a comprehensive identification strategy, appear to be a fruitful and challenging
avenue for future research.
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Appendix
Table A1: Country and Year Coverage
Albania (1999-2005) Latvia (1998-2005)
Argentina (1995-2005) Lithuania (1999-2005)
Armenia (1999-2005) Malawi (1998-2004)
Australia (1995-2004) Malaysia (1995-2004)
Austria (1995-2005) Malta (2004-2005)
Bangladesh (1996-2005) Mauritius (1999-2001)
Belgium (1996-2005) Mexico (1995-2005)
Bolivia (1996-2005) Moldova (1999-2005)
Brazil (1995-2005) Mongolia (1999-2005)
Bulgaria (1998-2005) Morocco (1998-1999)
Cameroon (1996-2001) Mozambique (1999-2003)
Canada (1995-2000) Nepal (2004-2004)
Chile (1995-2003) Netherlands (1996-2005)
China (1995-2005) New Zealand (1996-2004)
Colombia (1995-2003) Nicaragua (1998-2005)
Congo, Republic of (2005-2005) Niger (2005-2005)
Costa Rica (1997-2005) Norway (1996-2005)
Cote D’Ivoire (2001-2002) Pakistan (1995-2005)
Croatia (1999-2005) Panama (2001-2004)
Cyprus (2003-2005) Paraguay (1998-2005)
Czech Republic (1996-2005) Peru (1998-2005)
Denmark (1996-2005) Philippines (1995-2003)
Dominican Republic (2001-2005) Poland (1996-2005)
Ecuador (1996-2005) Portugal (1995-2005)
Egypt (1996-2005) Romania (1997-2005)
El Salvador (1998-2005) Russian Federation (1996-2005)
Estonia (1998-2005) Senegal (1998-2005)
Finland (1996-2005) Sierra Leone (2003-2003)
France (1995-2005) Singapore (1995-2000)
Gabon (2005-2005) Slovakia (1998-2005)
Gambia (2003-2003) Slovenia (1999-2005)
Germany (1995-2005) South Africa (1995-2000)
Ghana (1998-1999) Spain (1995-2005)
Greece (1995-2005) Sri Lanka (2002-2002)
Guatemala (1998-2002) Sweden (1995-2005)
Honduras (1998-2005) Switzerland (1996-2002)
Hungary (1995-2005) Syria (2004-2004)
Iceland (2004-2005) Tajikistan (2003-2004)
India (1995-2005) Tanzania (1998-2000)
Indonesia (1995-2005) Thailand (1995-2004)
Iran (2003-2005) Tunisia (1998-2000)
Ireland (1995-2005) Turkey (1995-2005)
Israel (1996-2001) Uganda (1996-2005)
Italy (1995-2005) Ukraine (1998-2005)
Jamaica (1998-2004) United Kingdom (1995-2005)
Japan (1995-1998) United States (1995-2004)
Jordan (1996-2003) Uruguay (1997-2005)
Kazakhstan (1999-2005) Venezuela (1995-2005)
Kenya (1996-2005) Vietnam (1998-2004)
Korea, Rep. (1995-2003) Yemen (2003-2005)
Kyrgyzstan (1999-2005) Zambia (1998-2004)
Number of cross-sections for each year: 1995 (32), 1996 (50), 1997 (38),
1998 (73), 1999 (82), 2000 (70), 2001 (72), 2002 (72), 2003 (73), 2004
(67), 2005 (66)
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